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Abstract. This paper examines the deontic logic of the Talmud. We shall find,
by looking at examples, that at first approximation we need deontic logic with
several connectives:
OT A Talmudic obligation
FT A Talmudic prohibition
FD A Standard deontic prohibition
ODA Standard deontic obligation.
In classical logic one would have expected that deontic obligation OD is definable
by
– ODA ≡ FD¬A
and that OT and FT are connected by
– OT A ≡ FT¬A
This is not the case in the Talmud for the T (Talmudic) operators, though it does
hold for the D operators. We must change our underlying logic. We have to regard
{OT , FT } and {OD, FD} as two sets of operators , where OT and FT are independent
of one another and where we have some connections between the two sets.
We shall list the types of obligation patterns appearing in the Talmud and
compare Talmudic Logic with modern deontic logic.
1 Motivating Talmudic Deontic Logic TDL
This paper is written for researchers in Deontic Logic and Contrary to Duties who
would like to know how things stand in Talmudic logic. To set the scene for our paper,
we give some short background material.
The simplest and historically first logical system oﬀered for dealing with obligation
is Standard Deontic Logic SDL, which is the modal logic KD for an operator ODA
reading ‘A is obligatory’. The semantics for O are models of the form (S ,R, h), where
R ⊆ S 2, h is the assignment to the atoms, assigining each atom q of the language a
subset h(q) ⊆ S , and R satisfies ∀x∃yxRy.
This system was too simple and researchers in the community oﬀered systems with
dyadic modalities OD(A/C), reading ‘A is obligatory in the context C’. This was a
response to contrary to duty examples which could not be properly modelled by the
unary OD.
One such famous example is the Chisholm set:1
1 The translation of (1)–(4) must give four consistent and logically independent sentences ade-
quately representing the linguistic text.
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1. It ought to be that a certain man goes to assist his neighbour.
2. It ought to be that if he does go he tells him he is coming.
3. If he does not go he ought not to tell him he is coming.
4. He does not go.
If we use H for ‘help’ and T for ‘tell’, we have two options to formalise this set, either
with ODX (unary) or with OD(X/Y) dyadic.
clause monadic dyadic
1. ODH OD(H/)
2. H → ODT H → OD(T/H)
3. ¬H → OD¬T ¬H → OD(¬T/¬H)
4. ¬H ¬H
The following sums up the spirit of the research of the deontic community.
1. Find reasonable logical systems involving various monadic or dyadic modal op-
erators with possible world or preferential semantics in which various linguistic
deontic sets can be consistently and adequately formalised.
2. Emphasise the CTD examples and calibrate your logics to deal with various prob-
lems associated with them.
The community lays stress on the theory of CTDs as distinctly characteristic to deontic
logic, which sets it apart from being a secondary applied branch of modal logic. It is
also felt that the essence of the deontic area is the possibility of violations and hence
the core of deontic logic as a discipline distinct from modal logic is its theory of CTD.
For our purpose a contrary to duty system is a set Δ of formulas of the form {δ1, . . . , δn}
where
δi = O(Xi/Y1 ∧ . . . ∧ Yk(i)).
Given a consistent set
θ = (E1, . . . , Ek)
we consider the set
Δθ = {Xi|δi(Xi/Y1 ∧ . . .Yk(i)) ∈ Δ and θ  Y j, j = 1, . . . , k(i)}
Δθ is the set of obligations triggered by the context θ. Δθ may be an inconsistent set and
part of any CTD logic is to “recommend” a consistent subset Δconθ ⊆ Δθ. The “logic” has
to deal coherently and in a compatible manner with common sense with the relationship
between pairs of the form (θ, Δconθ ) and (θ′, Δconθ′ ). As far as we know, no comprehensive
theory of this form exists. See references [1,2,3,4].
In contrast with the above, The Talmud, being a religious code of law, given to us by
God in the Bible, has two types of deontic rules: action obligations and action prohibi-
tions. Both types represent the will of God for us to obey. This is why at a first logical
approximation we need two independent deontic operations OT and FT (the subscript
‘T ’ stands for ‘Talmudic’) as well as the standard deontic prohibition FD.
There are some points we need to make clear. The variables X that go into the connec-
tives OT X, FT X,ODX and FDX denote actions like work, lift, steal, wear Tefilin (Tefilin
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is something men wear when they oﬀer morning prayers during week days), etc. and
not lack of action like resting, not stealing, etc. When we negate them and write ¬X, we
denote lack of action.
One might think that we can model obligations and prohibitions using only one deon-
tic operator O, letting OX represent obligations and O¬X represent prohibitions. How-
ever this is not correct. Our obligations and prohibitions can apply either to X or to ¬X.
See examples below under the heading “Type 3: Strong obligation/prohibition”.So OT X
is a Biblical obligation to take action X. OT¬X is a Biblical obligation not to take action
X. FT X is a Biblical prohibition to take action X and FT¬X is a Biblical prohibition not
to take action X (i.e. we are prohibited from choosing not to take action X). So OT X is
not equivalent to FT¬X. So if X = wear Tefilin, then having an obligation to wear it is
not the same as being prohibited from not wearing it. So in some cases God requires us
to obey both i.e. OT X ∧ FT¬X. The reader should recall intuitionistic logic where ¬¬A
is weaker than A, so the negation used in these commands have intuitionistic flavour.
(In fact, the Talmudic system was originally modelled in intuitionistic modal logic but
we decided to keep the logic classical, pending further modelling investigations).
If we look at this situation as logicians, we can say we have here three pairs of modal
operators, each pair being of the form (Necessity of the form NX and Possibility of the
form PX = ¬N¬X). The pairs are (Ni, Pi), i = 1, 2, 3 as follows.
1. OT X and ¬OT¬X
2. FT¬X and ¬FT X
3. ODX and ¬FDX = ¬OD¬X.
Since the Talmud gives no connections between OT and FT , we have to represent them
as two pairs {N1X = OT X, P1X = ¬OT¬X}, and {N2X = FT¬X, P2X = ¬FT X}.
This can be made clearer when we consider the operational diﬀerences between OT A
and FT A and FDA.
1. If you obey OT A then God rewards you. You are also obliged to spend 20% of your
income to enable yourself to fulfil your obligation.
2. If you violate FT A, and actually do the forbidden A, then you will be punished (by
God and or by law/society). Also you should devote 100% of your income to enable
yourself to avoid doing A.
Therefore for the same X, if the Bible says OT X then 1. applies and if the Bible says
FT¬X, which in practice means the same to us, then 2. applies.
FDA says it is forbidden to have A for whatever reason, without going into the fine
tuning of why this is so. It may arise from a Biblical OT¬A, or from FT A or from some
related FT Y or whatever.
For example, in Type 1A: Obligation with deontic prohibition below we have OT
(wear Tefilin during prayer). From this it follows that FD (pray without wearing Tefilin).
However we do not have a direct Biblical prohibition FT (pray without Tefilin), and
therefore if one actually does pray without wearing Tefilin, there is no punishment from
God.
Note that we do not necessarily have any connections like
OT X → ¬FDX
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and
FT X → FDX.
If we had them we could have derived
OT X → ¬FT X.
However we know that there is no such axiomatic connection in Talmudic logic. The
reason for that is as we mentioned earlier, OT and FT are in general generic and possibly
conflicting, and it is the Rabbis who decide day-to-day how to apply the commands in
any given situation.
It is possible also to have both FT X and OT X for the same X (even though on the
surface this seems contradictory) because X may be a generic kind of predicate and it
is expected that the Rabbis will decide for each situation s which obligation/prohibition
applies. In fact, in many cases the Bible gives recipes (more precisely there are indirect
hints in the Biblical text but the main derivation of recipes is done in the Talmud)
for making such decisions. In our model these recipes are part of the (nonmonotonic)
mechanisms of conflict resolution.
It is the job of the Rabbis to make decisions (according to some principles) how to
resolve conflicts between obligations and prohibitions when applied to any particular
situations.
The emphasis of Talmudic Deontic Logic is therefore on
1. Deciding what are the Biblical OT X, FT X. (This has been done: there are 613 mas-
ter ones, though opinions diﬀer as to which are included among these 613.)
2. Deciding which Biblical OT X, FT Y apply to any new arising situation s.
3. Resolving possible conflicts between applicable rules for any s.
The role of CTDs is not central to the Talmudic system, nor is the theoretical main-
tainance of consistency. The Biblical rules are known to cause conflict and established
procedures and recommendations and institutions for conflict resolution and practical
day-to-day decision making are also given by the Bible.
Note that there are diﬀerences between this decision making process and precedents
and legislation in law. We shall not go into that here.
The following table, Table 1, compares Talmudic Deontic ideas with their modern
counterparts.
To compare CTDs, let us look at some examples from the Bible.2
Example 1 (Chisholm variant 1)
1. You ought to have a ceremonial meal during the Passover festival.
2. If you have your meal you ought to say prayer (blessing, grace).
3. If you do not have the meal you ought not say the prayer (blessing).
4. You do not have the meal.
(1)–(3) are Biblical obligations. We formalise them using dyadic modalities.
1. OT M (or OT (M/))
2. M → OT B (or M → OT (B/M))
2 The Talmud interprets the Bible. So when we say Talmudic logic, this includes Biblical logic.
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Table 1.
Deontic com-
munity
Talmud Comments
Sources of
obligations and
prohibitions
common sense,
law, moral code
Bible/God It took hundreds of years to
study and summarise the Tal-
mudic obligations and prohibi-
tions. 613 major types were fi-
nally agreed upon by the end
of the middle ages, though as
we already mentioned, opinions
diﬀer as to which are included
among these 613.
Formalisation Monadic or
dyadic opera-
tors, preference
or possible
world models.
Two levels
OT , FT , and
OD, FD. The
handling meta-
logic is some
kind of time
action logic
Modern deontic logic is a well
developed area. This paper is a
first attempt in formalising Tal-
mudic deontic logic
Status of CTD central marginal The Talmud views CTD as just
more conditional obligations
Conflict resolu-
tion
Recognised but
not central yet.
The community
is beginning
to address the
problem.
central Deontic community recognises
the problem of inherited con-
flicting CTDs. They emphasise
consistency. Talmud expects in-
consistency even of original
obligations. Emphasises meth-
ods of resolving conflicts.
Status of viola-
tions
Violations are
expected, that
is why CTDs
are central,
but there is
no reward for
obeying a CTD.
Obeyance is ex-
pected
Talmud emphasises punishment
for violations and reward for
obeyance.
3. ¬M → FT (B/¬M)
4. ¬M.
Note that the Bible is explicit about FT (B/¬M) and does not say OT (¬B/¬M). The
Bible says generally “Do not use the name of God in vain”, which applies to this case
as well!
Exodus 20:7
You shall not take the name of the LORD your God in vain, for the LORD will
not leave him unpunished who takes His name in vain.
We do not have the equivalence OT (¬x/z) ≡ FT (x/z).
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Compare the above with the following.
Example 2 (Chisholm variant 2)
1. We are obliged to eat meat from sheep at passover.
Exodus 12:21
Then Moses called for all the elders of Israel and said to them, Go and take
for yourselves lambs according to your families, and slay the Passover
lamb.
2. If we eat meat we should slaughter the sheep humanely.
3. If we do not eat meat we should not slaughter the sheep.
4. We do not eat meat.
The translation is as follows (E is Eat and H is sheep):
1. OT (E/).
2. E → OT (H/E).
3. ¬E → FD(H/¬E)
4. ¬E
Note that in (3) we used FD because the Bible is not explicitly prohibiting killing ani-
mals for no reason but the prohibition follows from Rabbinical practical rulings.
Thus the reward from God for obeyance is diﬀerent in the two cases. Note that it is
easier to avoid the Chisholm paradox for examples 1.1 and 1.2 since our logic language
is more refined.
The rest of this section will give examples of the major existing types of Talmudic obli-
gations and prohibitions and formalise the examples in terms of OT , FT and FD. The
reader should note that we may have less or diﬀerent paradoxes for the Talmudic sys-
tem, which has more operators and so more fine distinctions can be made. Furthermore
if in ordinary deontic logic we allow more operators to stand for strong moral (parallel
to Talmudic) obligations and prohibitions, then we might find that some paradoxes dis-
appear. Although we have not given yet to the reader the axiom system and semantics
for these operators, we have given enough of their intuitive meaning and this should
suﬃce for our initial formalisation.
Let us now briefly describe the eight types of obligations and prohibitions available
in the Talmud.
We shall also give a preliminary intuitive formalisation in terms of OT , FT and FD
(note that OD is definable from FD, so we do not need it). In the sequel, we distinguish
Types 1A, 1B and 1C. They all arise from the same Biblical Talmudic obligation OT .
The diﬀerences between them is practical implementations, as summarised in Table 2.
Type 1A. Obligation with Deontic Prohibition
As an example, we have to respect and honour our parents (this is one of the Ten Com-
mandments), so we have OT (Respect Parents). If we do not respect our parents, there
is a violation. See Table 2 item 1A. The Bible says respect your parents so that you will
live long and prosper. It does not threaten punishment if you do not.
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Deuteronomy 20:8
Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which
the LORD thy God giveth thee.
Perhaps a modern example will help. We all read some Harry Potter books. The
newspapers reported that the author J. K. Rowling gave her father copies of the first
edition of her books, signed and dedicated by her. The idea was that he was supposed
to keep them. The father needed money and so he sold them. We formalise the inten-
tion/convention by OT keep ∧ FD¬keep.
He is not supposed to sell them because he is expected to keep them.
Type 1B. Weak Obligation
There is an obligation to live in the land of Israel. The question is whether from this
obligation there is a deontic prohibition on living outside Israel. The answer is no,
according to a minority opinion. Now if you do not live in Israel, there is no violation.
See Table 2, item 1B. This is a unique case where the weak obligation is some sort of
recommendation. You get a reward if you do it but there is no violation if you do not
do it.
Type 1C. Prohibition Arising from Positive Obligation
We need to let the land rest every seven years. As part of this the fruits of trees on the
seventh year are allowed to be eaten by anyone, not just the owners of the tree, but are
not allowed to be sold or traded with. This is to stop the temptation for farmers to work
the land and trade the produce.
We write this as
FD(trade fruit of tree)
We do want you to eat the fruit and not to sell them. We do not require in practice to eat
the fruit. The Talmudic OT eat is not enforced. I.e. you have no actual obligation to eat
the fruit only not to sell them.
Leviticus 25:1-7
God spoke to Moses at Mount Sinai, telling him to speak to the Israelites and
say to them: When you come to the land that I am giving you, the land must be
given a rest period, a sabbath to God. For six years you may plant your fields,
prune your vineyards, and harvest your crops, but the seventh year is a
sabbath of Sabbaths for the land. It is God’s sabbath during which you may
not plant your fields, nor prune your vineyards. Do not harvest crops that grow
on their own and do not gather the grapes on your unpruned vines, since it is a
year of rest for the land. [What grows while] the land is resting may be eaten
by you, by your male and female slaves, and by the employees and resident
hands who live with you. All the crop shall be eaten by the domestic and wild
animals that are in your land.
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Leviticus 25:20-22
And if ye shall say: ‘What shall we eat the seventh year?’ behold, we may not
sow nor gather in our increase’; then I will command My blessing upon you in
the sixth year, and it shall bring forth produce for the three years. And ye shall
sow the eighth year, and eat of the produce, the old store; until the ninth year,
until her produce come in, ye shall eat the old store.
To sharpen and clarify the distinctions between Type 1A and Type 1C, note that
during Sukkot, the feast of Tabernacles, we must eat our meals inside the Sukkah, a
temporary hut you build in your garden. However if you do eat outside the Sukkah, no
punishment is due. It is not clear how to formalise it. Opinions diﬀer, it is either of Type
1A or of Type 1C. The book Minhat Hinuch says that if we adopt Type 1A, then if one
uses a stolen Sukkah one has not fulfilled his obligation, since he committed a violation
in the process, however, if we adopt the view that the Type is 1C, then he has fulfilled
his obligation.
Compare with Type 2. For a prohibition of Type 2, of the form FT X, if we violate it
and do perform X we get punished! We do not get punished if we violate Type 1A or
Type 1C.
Table 2.
OT X If you do X If you do ¬X
Type 1A, in this
case we also
have FD¬X and
consequently
ODX
You obeyed the
will of God.
God rewards
you in Heaven
You committed violation. You
will have to face the conse-
quences in Heaven.
Type 1B, in this
case we do not
have FD¬X.
as above The incident is not recorded in
Heaven
Type 1C, in this
case we only
have FD¬X
without having
OT X
Your obeyance
is not recorded
in Heaven
You committed violation. You
will have to face the conse-
quences in Heaven.
Comment If you obey 1A by committing a violation which
harms other people, then obligation of type 1A
is not fulfilled (you are still considered as hav-
ing committed violation of 1A) but even under
these circumstances an obligation of type 1C is
fulfilled. See the book Minhat Hinuch.
Type 2. Full Prohibition
The Bible forbids the eating of pork.
FT (eating pork), and we do not have OT (¬ eat pork).
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Leviticus 11:7-8
And the pig, because it is parts the hoof and is cloven-footed but does not chew
the cud, is unclean to you. You shall not eat any of their flesh, and you shall not
touch their carcasses; they are unclean to you.
Type 3. Strong Obligation/Prohibition
This has the structure
OT¬X ∧ FT X
An example of this is the Biblical obligation/prohibition about work on the Sabbath
(seventh day). We have, for X = doing work, an obligation not to do work and also a
prohibition on working. So this is a very strong demand from God!
Another example, if you have a house with accessible roof you must install a railing
to the roof to prevent people falling oﬀ the roof. This can be interpreted as a typical
safety rule. Its status is that of a weak obligation introduced for good practice. If you
obey it, you will earn the good will of God. There is also prohibition on being without
a railing. So if you do not obey it, there is no punishment. We formalise this by writing
OT Rail and FT¬ Rail.
To quote the Bible:
Deuteronomy 22:8
When you build a new house, you must build a railing around the edge of its
flat roof. That way you will not be considered guilty of murder if someone falls
from the roof.
Note that in the Sabbath example the Obligation is on lack of action and the
prohibition is on action and in the roof example the obligation is on action and
the prohibition is on lack of action.
2 Contrary to Duties
Type CTD I. Obligation with Positive Contrary to Duty
You should not steal and if you steal you should return what is stolen. We can write:
1. FT S
2. (S → OT R)
or maybe the dyadic formalisation:
2a. S → OT (R/S )
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Type CTD II. Temporal Chain of CTDs
This example is from the Bible.
1. You should not rape a woman.
2. If you do rape a woman you must marry her.3
3. If you marry the woman you raped you can never divorce her.
We write this as
FT R ∧ (R→ OT (M/R)) ∧ (R ∧ M → FT (D/R ∧ M))
To quote the Bible:
Deuteronomy 22:28-29
If a man happens to meet a virgin who is not pledged to be married and rapes
her and they are discovered, he shall pay the girl’s father fifty shekels of silver.
He must marry the girl, for he has violated her. He can never divorce her as
long as he lives.
Type CTD III. Fine Tuning Required
Let us give some more examples of Contrary to Duties from the Talmud. These exam-
ples require further fine tuning and their delicate formalisation is postponed.
1. This is the mainstream example we mentioned before, which we recall here for
comparison, that we should not steal but if we do steal we have an obligation to
return the stolen property to its rightful owner. (This is a ‘repairing’ CTD.)
2. We have an obligation to pray three times a day. A morning prayer, an afternoon
prayer and an evening prayer. The time for the afternoon prayer is from noon to
sunset. The evening prayer should be done after sunset but before sunrise. The
rules governing this are as follows:
(a) It is obligatory to pray the afternoon prayer between noon and sunset.
(b) If one was not able, due to circumstances beyond his control, to oﬀer the af-
ternoon prayer before sunset one can still fulfill the obligation by oﬀering the
afternoon prayer 13 minutes after sunset. (This is called ‘make up’.)
(c) If time has passed and no afternoon prayer was oﬀered then one can oﬀer the
evening prayer twice, to make up for the afternoon prayer.
3. Another example is the Yevama example. If a woman becomes a widow without
children and her deceased husband has an unmarried brother, then the brother has
a duty to marry the widow to continue the family line. If the brother does not want
to do that, he has the duty to give the widow a special ‘divorce’ document to enable
her to be free to marry. (This is a ‘way out’, it is not a CTD or a ‘making up’.)
3 Assuming she is not married. If she is married, the guy is in really serious trouble! If she is not
married but does not want to marry the guy, he has to pay compensation only.
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4. A fourth example is the reading of the Book of Esther during the Purim festival.
The obligation is to read it standing, not sitting. This is the a priori obligation. But
if the reading was done sitting down, it does a posteriori discharge the reader from
his obligation. The Talmud makes a distinction between our obligations before the
event (‘Lechatchila’) and what is required after the event (‘Bede’eved’).
5. There are many more cases, for example where the same action violates several pro-
hibitions and obligations, some of them contradictory. These are solved in practice
(see Section 3).
Remark 1. The prayer examples and the Yevama example, are very interesting. They
hint to a type of contrary to duties which fulfill the original obligation and are not nec-
essarily just secondary obligations, which kick into action when the original obligation
is violated. The CTD can actually cancel the original violation. It is not a disjunction.
We do not have the disjunctive option of either reading the Book of Esther standing
or sitting. We should a priori try to read it standing but if we read it sitting the original
obligation to read it sitting is discharged. In comparison, if I steal a book and then return
it, I am still in violation of the ‘do not steal’ obligation. The diﬀerence is whether the
obligation relates to the process or to the resulting state (after the process).
3 Discussion and Future Research
In this section we discuss some issues to be clarified and pursued in future research.
The perceptive reader might wonder what kind of (Talmudic) logic we have here.
We do have the ordinary deontic logic SDL for the operators {OD, FD} and we have
two new completely unrelated Talmudic modalities OT and FT . We also have lots of
examples for them. So where is the logic?
Our answer to this is threefold:
1. Consider a modal logic with three separate KD modalities generated by OT , FT and
OD and study the correct axioms governing them.
2. We can equivalently regard OT X and FT X not as modalities but as labels. So each
wﬀ X will have several possible labels.
(a) neither OT X nor FT¬X
(b) OT X only
(c) FT¬X only
(d) both OT X and FT¬X
So the logic would be standard deontic logic applied to labelled formulas. This
approach also goes well with the fact that OT and FT obligation and prohibition
carry reward or punishment for obeyance and violations respectively. So the labels
can be used to indicate that information as well. Modal systems with labels exist
in the literature primarily as Gentzen or tableaux systems and there is work by D.
Gabbay and others in this direction [5,6]. So it should not be diﬃcult to tailor a
suitable Talmudic labelled variant of SDL. Our guess is that the system should also
be intuitionistic, as we have already mentioned earlier. Let us leave this question to
future research.
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3. The third remark about the logic involved is the nature of the CTDs in the Talmud.
There should be more empahsis on resolving conflicting obligations and prohibi-
tions. The system is built for people to use and live by day-by-day. So the most
important feature of the logic is to resolve conflicting obligations and prohibitions
arising from a multitude of CTD all triggered by past actions. For this again we
need a labelled system. Let us give a modern example to show what we mean and
thus realise that ordinary deontic logic has not fully addressed such problems.
Example 3. Suppose our starting point is that we have the following:
1. There should be no fence.
2. There should be no dog
3. If there is a dog there should be a fence
4. If there is a fence it should be white
5. If there is a dog and a fence it should be high
6. If there is a fence and it is not white it should be low
Some stubborn rebellious landlord does the following sequence of actions
(s1) get a dog
(s2) build a fence
(s3) paint the fence green.
He now decides to be a good boy and asks for our recommendation. Should he make
the fence high or low? How do we proceed?
First let us label his actions by the violations he performed, and ask at each stage
what our recommendation would have been. Then we ask if there is a simple case of
reverse actions (e.g. get rid of the dog) which will restore consistency. Then we decide
what to recommend.
So this is a special case of controlled revision see [7,8].4
So to sum up, we probably need to extend SDL by allowing labelled formula and in-
clude a revision operator ∗A (A revised) in the object language.
4 The following is the labelled history of actions violations. “+” means obeyance, “−” means
violation.
(s1) label [(−b)]
(s2) label [(−b), (+c), (−a)]
(s3) label [(−b), (+c), (−a), (−d)].
If he makes the fence low we will get also (+ f ) and (−e), and if he makes the fence high we
will also have (− f ) and (+e).
On the basis of the above history of labels we make a decision.
Controlled revision applies when we start with a theory Δ0 and have a series of inputs
A1, A2, A3 . . .. At stage n we have Δn, and when we revise to accommodate An+1 we must
remember the entire history of revisions and revise accordingly.
So, for example, if Δ0 = {A,A → B} and we get ¬B, we revise and get Δ1 = {¬B,A → B}.
If we now get input B, we ordinarily may revise and get Δ2 = {B,A → B}. But in controlled
revision we remember the history, so we know that we took out A and hence we bring it back
and revise to Δcontrolled2 = {A,A→ B}.
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The reader should be aware that the Talmudic way of resolving conflict is diﬀerent
and new to the traditional methods. So there is novelty in that.
Note that Talmudic CTDs have special features as discussed in Remark 1. We can
write OX and the contrary to duty saying that if in practice you have done X′ then we
consider OX as having been obeyed. So we can write OX and ¬X → OX′ and if X′ then
there is no violation of OX.
Example 4. To give you a glimpse of Talmudic style conflict resolution consider the
following two obligations
1. you should always be seen wearing a black suit at oﬃcial receptions
2. you must always wear a dark blue dinner suit at evening formal dinners.
You get a conflict when invited to an evening do with Her Majesty The Queen. What to
wear black or dark blue? Modern non monotonic logic will say rule 2 is more specific,
so it has priority. Talmudic reasoning also accepts that the more specific norm may
have priority, but in this case we have another simple option: Talmudic style conflict
resolution will say that in the evening in electric light dark blue looks black. So there is
no conflict! Note that this is not a logical solution but a practical one.
Note that we can give a practical solution to Example3 by recommending a low fence.
Since the fence is painted green, it blends with the grass and plants and can be con-
sidered as not violating the obligation that there should be no fence, but only in this
case!
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